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BOOK REVIEW
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
BY ARUuN P. AGGARWAL AND MADHU M. GUPTA
(Toronto: Buttenvorths, 2000)' xxvii + 508 pages, 3d ed.
The treatise has an important role in the making of law in a
common law system. When courts, tribunals, and even other scholars
recognize a work as the standard reference book in a particular subject
matter, they bestow upon it a power to infuse the law with its author's
particular vision. This tendency is emphasized in Canada, where the legal
publishing market is often too small to support multiple texts on a given
topic. Unfortunately, the fact that such works are as much the product of
their authors' politics as their painstaking research is not always recognized
by legal decision makers. John Wigmore on evidence and Glanville
Williams on the criminal law of rape provide two stark examples of the
fusion of se-ism and legal doctrine, yet their texts have been considered
seminal to our understanding of the law,.2 Once a work gains acceptance as
the standard reference in the area, judges and tribunals tend to treat such
works as telling them what the law is, rather than what the law should be. In
fact, these two facets of the treatise are often combined in ways that are not
always immediately apparent in the text.
Arjun Aggarwal's Sexmal Harassment ht the Morkplace was first
published in 1987, at a time when Canadian courts were still divided on the
question of whether sexual harassment in the workplace was a practice of
sex discrimination in employment. It remains the only scholarly Canadian
text on this important aspect of sex equality rights. For this reason, it is
worth reviewing this third edition not only for its treatment of significant
developments in sexual harassment law since the 1992 second edition, but
also for the underlying approach of this standard reference text to a topic
central to women's equality.
As for recent developments in the law, this edition reflects the fact
that there has been very little substantive development in Canadian sexual
harassment law in the last ten years. This stands in marked contrast to the
United States, where the Supreme Court has released four important
[hereinafter Seawal Harassment in the brplace.
G. Williams, Crininal Law: The General Part. 2nd ed, (London: Stewcn5, 1961); J.H. Wigmore.
Evidence in Trials at Common Lair, 3d ed. (Boston: Little Bron, 1972). See al n G. Williams' more
recent work, such as"The Meaning of Indecenc,"' 11992) 12 Legal Stud, 20, and his diuson of V-ifa
rape in "The Problem of Domestic Rape" (1991) 141 New LJ. 205, 24b-4Z
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decisions on sexual harassment since 1993.' This disparity is not surprising.
In the United States, women who are sexually harassed can sue in federal
court, offering the potential for meaningful damage awards. In Canada,
women, for the most part, must rely on the overburdened human rights
process, which promises meagre compensation after a process that can last
longer than most litigation. The utter failure of the Canadian system to
offer meaningful redress to women who have been harassed has produced
two outcomes. First, human rights commissions are now heavily promoting
mediation as a way of settling disputes. However, regardless of its
advantages, mediation does not produce jurisprudence. Second, unionized
women are turning to grievance arbitration to deal with sexual harassment
complaints. Once again, this is an essentially private process that takes
place in a labour relations setting rather than one focused on anti-
discrimination law or human rights. It provides little incentive to arbitrators
to explore general principles of sex equality law in their awards.
The third edition of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace reflects
these facts. First, American lawyer Madhu Gupta has been added as a co-
author and the materials on related U.S. law have been considerably
expanded; and, second, the authors have added material on alternative fora
for seeking a remedy for sexual harassment. For the most part, this material
is comprehensive and accurate.
The authors clearly take sexual harassment seriously, calling it a
"global issue" for the "new millennium" in their introduction.4
Unfortunately, this tone is not consistent throughout the book, nor is the
global, millennial "issue" raised by sexual harassment clearly identified.
One of the more awkward additions to this edition is chapter 2, entitled,
"Sexual Harassment in the Unexpected." This catch-all term encompasses
a list of sexually harassing behaviour by "the rich and famous," lumping
together President Clinton, the Speaker of the Ontario Legislature, Bob
Barker (host of the American game show The Price is Right) and Gordon
Stuckless, a former employee of Maple Leaf Gardens, among others. It is
difficult to draw any coherent organizing principles from this list. The
complaints against some of these men were legally proven; others were not.
The behaviour of Stuckless, who sexually assaulted a number of boys who
hung around the Gardens, was dealt with by the criminal law and has little
3 Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993); Oncalev.SundownerOffshore Services, 118 S. Ct.
998 (1998) [hereinafter Oncale]; Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); and Burlington Industries
v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
4 Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, supra note 1 at 71.
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to do with workplace harassment as that term is generally understood.
Presumably all targets of sexual harassment find the harassment
unexpected; it is hard to see what distinguishes these cases for such a title.
In a departure from the generally positive tone of the other
chapters, this chapter also alludes frequently to the trauma of false
accusations and the potential for the wealthy and the prominent to be
blaclnailed by unscrupulous women.5 This approach, which is repeated in
the section on sexual harassment of students by teachers, merely repeats,
without evidence, the stereotype that women use false allegations of sexual
impropriety to get revenge. This reasoning conveniently ignores the intense
hostility inflicted on the complainants in cases involving public figures.
This rather flawed attempt at bipolar objectivity is carried over to
the section of chapter 2 on "Sexual Harassment in Sports," in which a long
description of complaints made by athletes, of coerced intercourse and
other sexual assaults by coaches, is followed by an incongruous quote from
an American sports psychologist about coaches still learning the
"boundaries" of hugs and pats on the back.7 This section also errs in stating
that consent is always an issue for the purposes of the criminal law even
when the coach is in a position of authority. In fact, that is only the case
where the athlete is over the age of eighteen.?
This chapter does contain a generally useful and well-researched
discussion of same-sex sexual harassment, including the recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision on this topic? This is a topic that deserves better
treatment than to be buried under the rest of the material in this chapter.
There are a number of distracting errors in the new sections. For example,
the authors appropriate verbatim a passage from the U.S. Supreme Court
5 See e-g. ibid at 66, 73, 74.
6 One need look only as far as the treatment of the complainants in the three prominent cas-es
discussed in thischapter in which allegationswere not prown cClarence Thomas, Pre'_dent Clinton and
Bob Barker. The lesson to be drawn from these cases, if there is one, is that it is not eaFy to mAe a true
allegation, let alone a false one.
7 Soxal Harassment in the Workplace. supra note I at 85.
8Ibhi at 86. This is one of a number of minor inaccuracies about the criminal law in thisbo A For
example, the authorsvwTite that the complainant must bear the costs of a criminal prosccution, when in
fact these are borne by the state, as in a human rights proceeding.
9 Oncale, supra note 3.
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decision." This oversight, and the many other similar editing errors, need
to be corrected in the next edition.
Chapter Three, "Characteristics of Sexual Harassment," is perhaps
the most important chapter in the book, since if complainants cannot prove
that the conduct to which they object meets the definition of the term,
questions of remedy are irrelevant. This chapter has not changed a lot since
the second edition and is generally clear and accurate. It is also more
condemnatory of sexual harassment and less likely to lapse into the
language of false accusations and over-sensitive complainants than the
previous chapter. However, the authors fail to recognize explicitly that, at
times, they are taking a position on what the law should be, rather than
merely reporting what it is accepted as being.
One example of this tendency is the issue of the unwelcomeness of
the alleged harasser's conduct. The authors correctly note that not all
sexual comment or contact between coworkers is sexual harassment. They
suggest that the complainant, therefore, bears the onus of "making it
known, in clear and precise terms that such actions are not acceptable,""
a passage which has been relied on by some human rights tribunals. 2 Yet
placing a resistance requirement on the complainant is neither a necessary
nor an immediately obvious consequence of the sexual harassment or sex
discrimination legislation in most provinces. Placed at its highest, the
legislation in Ontario requires proof that the harasser ought to have known
that his or her conduct is unwelcome23 Not even this provision necessarily
requires that the complainant object. In other jurisdictions where
legislation contains no such express requirement, it has been held sufficient
in many decisions that the complainant prove that the conduct or
comments were sexual in nature, that they were unwelcome to the
complainant, and that they negatively affected the complainant's work
opportunities or working environment. 4 In the case of employers,
constructive knowledge that the conduct was occurring may be required to
ground liability for harassment by non-supervisory employees, but there is
10 Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, supra note 1 at 112. See the first paragraph under the
heading "Application to Canadian Law." This paragraph is in fact a direct quote, properly attributed
on page 111,
Ibid. at 119.
12 Hanes v. M & M Ventures (1998), 35 C.H.R.R. D/199 (Sask. Bd. Inq.).
Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19, s. 10(1), "harassment."
14 See e.g. the formulation adopted in Ferguson v. Muench Works Ltd. (1997), 33 C.H.R.R. D/87
(B.C.C.H.R.).
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still no requirement that the complainant object. To hold otherwise, as
some tribunals have done, is to bootstrap a mental element into a statutory
scheme that is not supposed to be concerned Ath whether discrimination
is intentional.
The discussion of unwelcomeness, consent, and the relevance of the
complainant's demeanour is confused and ambiguous, at times reinforcing
the earlier assertion of a resistance requirement, at other times belying it."
Similarly, after relying on U.S. authority to expressly distinguish consent
from "voluntariness," the authors later state that if behaviour is consensual,
it cannot be considered unvelcome.1 6 However, there is no explanation of
the difference in Canada, if any, between voluntariness and consent.' 7
SexualHarassment in the Wforkplace is well-researched. At times, the
discussion tends to privilege the earlier cases, which continue to receive
lengthy treatment even where their reasoning has been superseded by later
decisions."a One suspects that this is an outcome of merely updating, rather
than rewriting sections from past editions. The next edition should make a
more vigorous attempt to prune back some of this jurisprudential dead
wood.
It is also not always clear why the authors choose to favour the
statement of the law found in one decision or aard, as opposed to another,
given that there is no system of precedent in human rights decisions. For
example, in the discussion of revealing uniforms and buttons that invite
sexual harassment from customers, the authors discuss the Molly 'N Me
Tavern decision, which simply states the test as to whether female
employees engaging in work essentially similar to male employees are
required to bear the additional burden of becoming entertainers based on
L5 Compare Seaual Harass~ment in the Morkplace, vaipra note I at 128 ("It is sufficient for the
Complainant to establish that she by her conduct or body mo cment or body language comeyed to the
perpetrator her disapproval of his advances."),vith tbh at 145 p"Byestablhmgthat harassmentezu-urs
onlywhen the harasser's intentions are deliberate, this lea% cs a loophole for the harazers to claim that
theywere unaware that their behaviour was offensive.").
16 id. at 121, 133.
17 The term "voluntariness" was used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mentor Sasvn3 B,34- v.
l'-san, 477 U.S. 57 (19S6) as a synonyin for consent in the criminal law of rap, namely that the
complainant's submission to sexwas, though unwanted, not immediatelypreceded bytiolence or threats
of violence. This is not the definition of consent used in Canadian criminal law, mating it questionable
whether this distinction is relevant here.
is See ag. the lengthy discussion of delays in adjudication ($aScal Harassment m the pe ace.
supra note 1) at 230-47.
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their dress.' 9 They also mention Allan v. Riverside Lodge, which adds the
requirement that the dress code "lack justification in commonly accepted
social norms." 20 This additional element presumes that the status quo for
dress is not sexist, an approach at odds with human rights legislation. The
authors conclude that, "whether or not a dress or grooming requirement
constitutes 'sexual harassment' or 'sex discrimination' may be judged by the
... test provided by theAllan case."21 There is no explanation as to why the
Allan test is being favoured or even a recognition that it adds an additional
element that risks perpetuating sexist norms of dress.22
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace is at times repetitive, but that
is probably a virtue. Few readers of this book will read it from cover to
cover. Instead, it is likely used by most of its readers as a reference book to
explain the correct legal principles in a certain area. Unfortunately, where
areas are covered twice, they are not always consistent.' This is probably
the result of a lack of rigour in updating. At times I read portions of this
book aghast at the fact the authors seemed entirely unaware of an
important new authority on the topic, only to find the authority discussed
later in the text in a similarly titled subsection. If the casual reader does not
find all the sections that deal with a particular topic, he or she may be
misled.
The greatest achievement of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace is
the thoroughness of its research. From my own review of this book, I
learned of a number of helpful cases on areas of interest that I had not
come across elsewhere. Almost every possible aspect of sexual harassment
law is addressed in the text. For example, the authors include a brief
discussion of a case in which it was argued that harassment by patrons was
a bona fide occupational requirement (bfor) for an employee at a youth
centre, and another section on complaints by live-in nannies of sexual
harassment by their employer's husband or teenaged children.24 Thus, the
19 Susan Ballantyne v. Molly 'NMe Tavern (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1191 (Ont. Bd. Inq.).
20 (1985),6 C.H.R.R. D/2978 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) [hereinafterAllan].
21 Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, supra note I at 162.
2 2 The text should also have been updated to recognize that the "similarly situated" approach to
discrimination has been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada since Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
23 See e.g. the distinction between quidpro quo and co-worker harassment, which is recognized
as rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, [19891 1 S.C.R. 1252, and
later revived in Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, supra note 1 at 216.
24 Seual Harassment in the Workplace, supra note I at 300-01.
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authors are thus well poised to incorporate new developments into the next
edition. Later chapters exhaustively survey remedies available to the
complainant under a variety of statutes and in a number of fora, including
a helpful discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Bdlireau
St-JacquesY
Oddly, Seual Harassment hi the Workplace has no conclusion. The
final chapter which deals briefly with "Unions and Sexual Harassment,"
makes the questionable claim that most union members would prefer to
deal with intra-union complaints of sexual harassment internally and then
simply ends with an unanswered question about arbitrability. The lack of
any conclusion to this book is, in my view, significant. The authors of this
book care about sexual harassment and treat it as a serious problem. They
do not, for the most part, aspire to a false bipolar objectivity that treats
sexual harassment as a contest between accuser and accused, although the
newer material has the troubling tendency to veer in that direction. But
their book does not consistently grasp the link between sexual harassment
and women's inequality. The legal claim for sexual harassment was
formulated on an understanding of sexual harassment as an act of male
dominance. A book that truly understood this could be consistent in its
analysis and criticism and would be able to synthesize the case law
coherently. Such a book would have a point of view, but that perspective
would be apparent rather than obscured. The third edition of Sexual
Harassment in the iorkplace is regrettably not that book. Nonetheless, it
remains an important starting point for anyone interested in researching,
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